With his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which are formulated here as Problem i and Problem ii. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell's solution. We deal with Russell's concepts of existence and then elaborate his presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Next we discuss the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell's understanding of the objects of reference. These principles are such that if the objects of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics, or very close to such an interpretation. Finally we show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or special or general relativity. W ith his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which will be formulated subsequently as Problem i and Problem ii. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell's solution (secs. 1-2). In section 3 we deal with Russell's concepts of existence. Section 4 elaborates Russell's presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Section 5 discusses the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell's understanding of the objects of reference. These principles, as will be shown, are such that if the objects of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics or at least very close to such an interpretation. Sections 6 and 7 show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or objects of special or general relativity.
With his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which are formulated here as Problem i and Problem ii. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell's solution. We deal with Russell's concepts of existence and then elaborate his presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Next we discuss the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell's understanding of the objects of reference. These principles are such that if the objects of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics, or very close to such an interpretation. Finally we show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or special or general relativity. W ith his theory of descriptions Russell wanted to solve two problems concerning denotation and reference, which will be formulated subsequently as Problem i and Problem ii. After presenting each problem, we describe the main points of Russell's solution (secs. [1] [2] . In section 3 we deal with Russell's concepts of existence. Section 4 elaborates Russell's presuppositions concerning the relation of denoting and referring. Section 5 discusses the presuppositions or principles which underlie Russell's understanding of the objects of reference. These principles, as will be shown, are such that if the objects of reference are material objects, they are objects of classical mechanics or at least very close to such an interpretation. Sections 6 and 7 show how these principles have to be relaxed if the objects of reference are objects of quantum mechanics or objects of special or general relativity. 1 "A name is a simple symbol whose meaning is something that can only occur as subject, i.e. something of the kind that, in Chapter xiii, we deWned as an 'individual' or a 'particular'z " (Russell, IMP, p. 173) . "We shall deWne 'proper names' as those terms which can only occur as subjects in propositions.… We shall further deWne 'individuals' or 'particulars' as the objects that can be named by proper names" (ibid., p. 142).
2 "A name … is a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words …" (IMP, p. 174) . " [I] fz 'az' is a name, it must name something: what does not name anything is not a name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol devoid of meaning …" (ibid., p. 179).
3 "Suppose we say: 'The round square does not exist.' It seems plain that this is a true proposition ..." (PM 1: 66).
1.wproblem i
Problem i:
(1) If names are deWned as linguistic expressions "directly designating an individual", and (2) if this individual is the meaning of the name, 1 and since (3) linguistic expressions like "the round square" do not designate an individual, then it follows: (4) that such linguistic expressions are not names and do not have meaning. However, linguistic expressions (sentences) like "the round square does not exist" are surely meaningful and true, which can hardly be understood if the expression "the round square" is neither a name nor has any meaning.
According to Russell, a theory which gives an adequate solution to Problem i should satisfy the following conditions:
(a) it has to accept as true all three premisses and the conclusion in Problem i (b) Russell's deWnition of name (as indicated in note 1) (c) his identiWcation of reference and meaning in the case of names 2 (d) his requirement that although expressions like "the round square" or "Hamlet" or "the even prime greater than 2" … etc. are neither names nor have meaning (in isolation), they may occur in sentences which can be meaningful and true. 4 "Thus all phrases (other than propositions) containing the word the (in the singular) are incomplete symbols: they have a meaning in use, but not in isolation. For 'the author of Waverleyz' cannot mean the same as 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author of Waverleyz ' would mean the same as 'Scott is Scott', which it plainly does not; nor can 'the author of Waverleyz' mean anything other than 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author of Waverleyz ' would be false. Hence 'the author of Waverleyz ' means nothing" (PM 1: 67; see also 180). 5 "[W]e do not deWne 'the x which satisWes fˆ xz,' but we deWne any proposition in which this phrase occurs" (PM 1: 173).
6 Cf. PM 1: 11. This was also noted by Lambert 1990, p. 141f. Russell's theory of descriptions-as it is contained in Principia Mathematica and in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy-satisWes conditions (a) to (d). Because of conclusion (4) above, descriptive phrases like (_yxz )fx do not have meaning and are not names, they are "incomplete symbols"; 4 thus they are not substitution instances of real variables. However, although (_yxz )fx does not have meaning and thus cannot be deWned-i.e. it cannot stand alone as the deWniendum of a deWnitionz -z (_yxz )fx can stand in a larger context such that this context has meaning. 5 Russell gives two important sentences which have meaning and in which (_yxz )fx occurs. Each of these sentences can Wgure as the deWniendum of a deWnition. These two sentences are: "the so-and-so is a such-and-such", or "(_yxz )fx has the property cy". And "the so-and-so exists", or "(_yxz )fx exists":
In both cases the uniqueness (that at least and at most one object satisWes fxz ) follows from the right part (the deWniensz ) of the deWnition.
Observe, however, that Russell is not entirely consistent with his use of (_yxz )fx. DeWnition * 30.01 is not in accordance with * 14 (the chapter on deWnite descriptions) of Principia Mathematica in this respect:
Ry'y = (_yxz )xRy Df
Here both parts, deWniendum and deWniens, can hardly be incomplete symbols without meaning, since it holds in general for deWnitionsz that the deWniendum has the same meaning as the deWniens. 6 Russell is aware of the diUculty here and gives a "more formally correct" formulation of this deWnition with functions and scope indication (p. 232f.). However, 7 In Russell's words: "z'Scott is the author of Waverley.' … This proposition expresses an identity; thus if 'the author of Waverleyz ' could be taken as a proper name, and supposed to stand for some object cz , the proposition would be 'Scott is cz'. But if c is any one except Scott, this proposition is false; while if c is Scott, the proposition is 'Scott is Scott', which is trivial, and plainly diTerent from 'Scott is the author of Waverleyz 'z" (PM 1: 67) . "If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverleyz; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott for the author ofz 'Waverley', and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the Wrst gentleman of Europe" (OD, Mind n.s. 14: 485; Papers 4: 420).
this is not a real way out of the problem since * 30.01 is still a deWnition of Principia Mathematica. A related diUculty appears with deWnition * 62.01, where "ey" (membership) is deWned.
2.wproblem ii
Problem ii:
(1) If linguistic expressions of the form "the author of Waverleyz " are permitted as substitution instances of names, and (2) if the sentence "the author of Waverley is Scott" is true if and only if Scott is identical with the author of Waverley, and since (3) expressions connected by the identity sign may be substituted for each other, then it follows: (4) that the sentence "the author of Waverley is Scott" is logically equivalent to the sentence "Scott is Scott". However, the sentence "Scott is Scott" is an instance of the law of identity-which is a logical truth, or theorem, of Principia Mathematica-whereas the sentence "Scott is the author of Waverleyz " needed empirical investigation for establishing its truth. 7 According to Russell, the conclusion ofz Problem ii is false. Hence one of the premisses has to be false. The second premiss is true and so is the third (substitution with the help of identity). Therefore the Wrst premiss must be false. And this means that descriptions (descriptive phrases) are not substitution instances of real variables: a = (_yxz )fxz is not a substitution instance of a = yz , from which it follows that (_yxz )fxz is not a value of y. Therefore, although (xz )x = xz is a theorem ( * 13.15), (_yxz )fx = (_yxz )fxz is not a theorem. Also: ('yz )y = xz is a theorem ( * 13.19), but ('yz )y = (_yxz )fxz is not a theorem.
However, existence in the sense of uniqueness is a suUcient and necessary condition for (_yxz )fx = (_yxz )fxz :
And since it is the case that
it is also the case that:
A consequence of this is that the law of identity does not hold for objects which do not satisfy uniqueness. Thus "Hamlet = Hamlet" and "the round square = the round square" are both false. Whereas there is widespread agreement that inconsistent objects are not identical, i.e. do not satisfy the law of identity, it is not so clear why objects which are not logically inconsistent, but which factually do not exist, cannot be selfidentical. Such objects might be roughly of two sorts: those which violate some law of nature (like Pegasus or huge giants), and those which are in accordance with laws of nature but do not exist because of some accidental reason, i.e. some initial conditions (like red swans or blue ravens). Concerning the second case, we can also easily imagine that humans with the heart on the right side or left-hand screwed snail shells, which are both very rare, would (factually) not exist at all. In this connection there is another claim of Russell which is not completely correct: "Generalizing, we see that the proposition a = (_yxz )fx is one which may be true or may be false, but is never merely trivial, like a = a …" (PM 1: 67). What Russell has in mind here is that (_yxz )fx must not be understood as a name (or as a real variable), otherwise it would be trivial (i.e. a = az ) if true. However, it is permitted to substitute "x = ay" for "fxy", which gives (_yxz )(x = az) = a, and this is a theorem ( * 14.2) of Principia Mathematica. Thus the proposition a =(_yxz )fxz is in fact "trivial" in the sense of being a theorem-i.e. not a factual empirical truth-if "fxy" is instantiated by "x = ay". (This point has also been discussed by Lambert 1990, p. 143.) 8 For a detailed elaboration see Weingartner 1966.
3.wrussell's concepts of existence
There are mainly three concepts of existence formalized in the system of Principia Mathematicaz : Existence represented by the existential quantiWer ('xz )fx, existence expressed through uniqueness Ez !z (_yxz )fxz , and existence expressed by non-emptiness of a class 'z !a. 8 
3.1wExistence represented by the existential quantiWer
Existence in the sense of the existential quantiWer (applied to a propositional function) is presented in Principia Mathematica * 9 ( * 9.1.11) from which the universal quantiWer is derived ( * 10.01). Semantically the notion is based on the non-emptiness of the universe of discourse and the fact that objects belong to it by virtue of their being self-identical ( * 24.01).
(1) First, there is a universal class or in other words the universal class is not empty:
This proposition rests on * 9.1 fx á ('zz )fz or on * 10.1 (xz )fx á fy.
The underlying idea is that all the individual variables or variables of lowest type refer to one and the same universe of discourse and this universe is not empty, i.e. there is something.
(2) Secondly, the universal class is deWned as the class of objects which are self-identical:
Based on * 24.01, on the theorem of identity x = x and on the principle * 20.15, which converts equivalent predicative statements into identical classes and vice versa, the universal proposition (xz )fx can be deWned in such a way that it means that a certain related set is identical with the universal set:
Cf. Menne 1959, p. 103, and Wang 1962, p. 347 . 10 Bernays 1950. Cf. also Beth 1956, § §9, 11, 31, 32, and 1959, Part v. (4) From this it follows that the universal negative proposition (xz )x¬xfx means that a certain related set is identical with the nullset:
From this theorem we can derive a kind of deWnition of the existential statement:
This says: there is an x with the property f if and only if it is not the case that the class of all y satisfying fyz is identical with the null-class. Since being identical with the null-class was interpreted as being inconsistent, not being identical with the null-class was interpreted as being consistent. On these lines a view developed which is expressed by the rather problematic slogan, "Existence in Logic and Mathematics means consistency." Russell did not make such a claim, it seems. But Albert Menne and Hao Wang, for example, did, 9 although already in 1950 Bernays pointed out correctly that the above slogan is only a half-truth and neglects important diTerences.
10 What is shown in proofs is how one can proceed from establishing an example or from constructing a model to consistency, or from a discovered contradiction (inconsistency) to non-existence. But what is not shown is the other direction of the claimed equivalence: how one could proceed from an established consistency to existence. Although the above slogan is supported by the fact that in several domains of logic and mathematics a proposition is satisWed by at least one object (or model), or satisWed by no object (or model), the warning of Bernays is important: in logic and higher-order mathematics, consistency is a necessary and suUcient condition only for non-standard models. Therefore "existence" has to be relativized to the system or domain. "The kind of existence just deWned covers a great many cases."
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For this kind of existence, uniquenessz -z i.e. that there is at least one and at most one objectz-zis a necessary and suUcient condition. It has the following properties:
(a) It applies only to objects which already have properties.
(b) The existence deWned is a kind of "individual existence" in the sense of uniqueness. Observe, however, that uniqueness is also satisWed by natural numbers. This shows that this kind of individual existence is not speciWc for individuals in space and time, like for example the Aristotelian substance. (c) It is suitable for negative existential statements, e.g. "there is no Pegasus" or "there is no number which is even and prime and greater than 2." Observe however that it does not Wt very well with negative existential statements of the sort "there is no perpetuum mobile", since in this case no individual existence is denied. (d) Because this kind of existence can be denied with regard to certain objects, these objects cannot belong to the universe of discourse and therefore descriptions are not substitution instances of real variables (cf. §2 above). (e) Primary and secondary occurrences (and a scope indication) of the descriptive phrase allow us to distinguish two kinds of negations with regard to existence. Using Russell's example, "the King of France exists and is not bald" can be precisely distinguished from "it is not the case that the King of France exists and is bald." (fy) The question "Ez !z (_yxz )fxy?" is widely applicable: in all investigations in which we do not want to presuppose the existence (uniqueness) of (_yxz )fx (i.e. of a new object of investigation) before a proof or argument or empirical evidence has been given. Examples: discoveries of new elementary particles, of new stars, of black holes … proofs of the existence of God.
3.3wExistence expressed by non-emptiness of a class
Class-existence is deWned by Whitehead and Russell thus: Ez !z (_yaz )(x e a ≡ x fxz ) * 20.56 says that every propositional function (fxz ) deWnes a class. However, these classes are type-theoretically restricted.
In the subsequent sections we will concentrate on the type of existence that is deWned with the help of uniqueness.
3.4wOther proposals for deWnite descriptions and existence as uniqueness
This is only a very rough sketch of some important peculiarities of other proposals compared to Russell's: "free-description-theory". "The so-and-so" is constructed as a singular term. If uniqueness is not satisWed, the term does not assign anything in the domain of discourse.
Compared to these theories, Russell's theory of description is iotaeliminating, relatively (see below) universally applicable, but it is not complete in the sense of Montague-Kalish. Concerning applicability, it is more universal than the one of Frege-Carnap, since the latter requires individual constants. 12 Cf. the quotation from Russell (IMP, p. 174) in note 2.
However, it will become clear especially from sections 6 and 7 that neither Russell's theory, nor one of the other proposals, seems to be suitable to handle the "objects" of modern physics, i.e. objects in quantum theory or in the theory of relativity: they are incomplete concerning their properties, they do not satisfy uniqueness or temporal identity, they are not rigid, i.e. they change their essential properties when they are arbitrarily moved in space. But they still belong to the universe of discourse (not to the null set or to the outer domain, nor are they non-referring), since they are described by physical laws. On the other hand, the objects presupposed by these theories of description come close to the objects of classical mechanics: they are not supposed to change properties like mass or geometrical shape just by moving through space, and they are not supposed to lose uniqueness during an interval between a Wrst and second observation (measurement).
4.wpresuppositions of russell's proposal concerning the relation of denoting or referring
4.1wA name directly designates an individual (object) which is its meaning. 12 That is, the relation of denoting, designating or referring is a twoplace relation, and reference is identiWed with meaning. It seems that Russell's view concerning descriptions presupposes the same; and if uniqueness is not satisWed, there is no reference and no meaning. In Russell's theory of denoting or referring concerning both real variables and descriptive phrases, there seems to be no place for more elements with regard to the relation of denoting or referring. According to the medieval theory, this relation involves three components: name concept reference description 9 yconceptual constructiony A meaning, content object A similar three-place relation was adopted by Meinong, but Russell was proud to be able to skip Meinong's content. conceptual) entities or physical objects; that is, this relation is independent of whether the relata are conceptual objects (which are neither spatial nor temporal) or physical objects in space and time.
4.3wMathematical entities are always rigid in the sense that they either (sharply) satisfy uniqueness or do not. Physical entities, on the other hand, are not always rigid. But in Russell's understanding all objects of reference are rigid. To substantiate § §4.2 and 4.3 one has to know Wrst that according to Russell "all the objects of common-sense and developed science are logical constructions out of events.…" 13 Secondly, that these logical constructions which are built from physical objects are like conceptual entities and thus rigid and impenetrable: " [T] he events out of which we have been constructing the physical world are very diTerent from matter as traditionally conceived.... The matter that we construct is impenetrable as a result of deWnition.…"
14 Under "matter as traditionally conceived" Russell understands matter as a permanent indestructible substance.
5.wprinciples of russell's proposal concerning the objects of reference
The presuppositions or principles listed here cannot be substantiated directly by giving quotations in the literal sense from Russell's works. But they seem to be hidden by Russell's treatment of objects of reference and by consequences of such treatment (see the quotations in §4.3 above). In this respect it is of particular importance that objects in space and timez -z physical objectsz -z are understood as logical constructions of objects in the sense of classical mechanics (even if sometimes entities at the microlevel like electrons are mentioned). Russell's ABC of Relativityz , well written for its time of publication, did not inXuence-so it seems-in any speciWc way his theory of denoting or his theory of descriptions. In the ABC of Relativityz there is no connection made to his theory of descriptions.
In general, Russell's view concerning physical objects is, as is to be expected, guided by §4.2 and §4.3: objects of reference (of names or de- 15 Kant 1787, b600. Cf. the discussion in Mittelstaedt and Weingartner 2005, pp. 268, 271f. and 276f. 16 AMa, p. 385. 17 Cf. Mittelstaedt 1986, p. 219f . A more detailed and precise deWnition for "classical physical object" or "object of classical mechanics" is given in Mittelstaedt and Weingartner 2005, p. 271f. scriptions which satisfy uniqueness) are interpreted as rigid in a similar sense to mathematical entities or-applied to physics-in a similar sense to objects of classical mechanics.
5.1wValue-completeness
If (_yxz )fx satisWes uniqueness, then the object of reference is a bearer of value-deWnite (or value-complete) properties. This presupposition was accepted and deWned by Kant: of all possible predicates of an object as a bearer of predicates, one of each pair of opposite (or contradictory) predicates must belong to it. In Kant's words: "… every thing as regards its possibility, is likewise subject to the principle of complete determination, according to which if all the possible predicates of things are taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it." 15 A physical consequence of §5.1 is that every individual (or physical) object possesses always a well-deWned position in space. This holds also for Russell, according to whom the most elementary physical objects are his "events": "[T]he matter in a place is all the events that are there, and consequently no other event or piece of matter can be there. This is a tautology, not a physical fact.…" 16 The above consequence is, however, typical for the domain of classical mechanics and does not hold generally (cf. §6 below).
5.2wMechanical object
If (_yxz )fx satisWes uniqueness, then the object of reference is a bearer of such (essential) properties as mass, charge and geometrical shape, which transform covariantly under the transformations of the Galilean group. That means that the object remains rigid under translation in space, under orientation in space, under translation in time and under inertial movement with arbitrary velocity. In this sense "mechanical object" or "mechanical system" can be characterized by the Galilean symmetry group.
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From this it will be clear that the opposite implication does not hold:
that an object which satisWes the Galilean group satisWes (_yxz )fx. It is a whole class of objects (the objects of classical mechanics) which satisWes the Galilean group and not a single object only.
5.3wUniqueness
If (_yxz )fx satisWes uniqueness, then the object of reference is unique, according to classical mechanics, by its deWnite (or accidental) properties: by position (z pz ), momentum (qz ) and point in time (ty). This holds under the additional assumption of the impenetrability of the object in a spacetime point (which does not follow from the dynamical laws). But this assumption seems to be hidden in Russell's view of event and place (see the quotation from him in §5.1 above).
Whether Newton has already proved uniqueness is diUcult. The question is whether he has shown that, besides the one, there does not exist a diTerent, second trajectory satisfying the same initial conditions along which a body can move in obeying his laws, including his law of gravitation. According to Arnold, Newton showed by checking many solutions of the laws that they depend smoothly (continuously) on the initial data. But the theoretical proof seems to have been given Wrst by Johann Bernoulli (cf. Arnold 1990, p. 31f.).
5.4wReidentiWability
If (_yxz )fxz satisWes uniqueness, then the object of reference is reidentiWablez through time; i.e., that it has temporal identity. This reidentiWability in turn requires two conditions to be fulWlled: (a) There has to be a dynamical law which connects the object in state Sz 1 (p, q, tz 1 ) with the reidentiWable object in state Sz 2 (p, q, tz 2 ). (b) The objects have to be impenetrable such that there can be only one object at a space-time point (see the quotation from Russell in §5.1 above).
5.5wObserver-invariance
If (_yxz )fxz satisWes uniqueness, then all observers of the object of referencez -z in other words, all laboratories with rods and clocks in which the object is investigatedz -z are equal; there is no designated observer or laboratory. All observers will arrive at the same result concerning the unique object of reference. 18 For a detailed justiWcation cf. Weingartner 1996, Chap. 7, and Mittelstaedt and Weingartner 2005, pp. 181T. 19 For a detailed justiWcation cf. Mittelstaedt 1986, pp. 241T.
5.6wTransworld identity
According to our understanding of "law of nature", the laws of nature are valid in all physically possible worlds which diTer from our world only with respect to individual states or initial conditions.
18 Thus individual states or initial conditions are not designated by any law either in this world or in another physically possible world. Therefore no law determines whether some individual initial state of our world can be found in any of the other physically possible worlds. This is particularly true of the dynamical laws of classical mechanics. Consequently, although a dynamical law connects two individual states of our world, and although it will connect two individual states in another world, it does not connect two individual states of two diTerent worlds. From this it follows immediately that transworld identity of individual states is not guaranteed in classical mechanics.
The same holds for the objects of reference of classical mechanics. For any such object (_yxz )fxz satisfying uniqueness, its identity cannot be guaranteed in any other possible world, independently of how the accessibility relation is deWned. Although such an object is reidentiWable in one world, it is not reidentiWable from one world to another one. 19 It follows that an application of Kripke's semantics to classical mechanics will lead only to a redundant extension, since its interpretation of "possible" and "necessary" reduces to factual (i.e. to true or false) in our world.
6.ware the principles about the objects of reference valid when applied to the microlevel?
6.1wValue-completeness
Applied to stable elementary particles like electrons, protons and neutrons (or to stable composed systems), there is no general value-completeness or value-deWniteness; the object of reference is, in general, not a bearer of value-deWnite (or value-complete) properties (cf. §5.1 above). At time tz the object, as it is known through measurement results, can be the bearer only of a selected or limited number of properties, i.e. those which are mutually commensurable. The conceptual construction of the object as it is known by measurement resultsz -z Russell's logical construc-20 For more on permutational symmetry cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner 2005, pp. 74, 77, 82. tionz -z is necessarily incomplete. Therefore the description (_yxz )fx of such an object, since it is not value-deWnite (cf. §5.1), will not satisfy uniqueness. As a consequence of that, the conceptual (or logical) construction which is incomplete cannot, in general, be identiWed with the reference. Thus if we interpret the conceptual construction as the meaning, it should not be identiWed with the reference (in contradistinction to Russell).
6.2wPermutation invariance
The Schrödinger equation holds for kinds of objects, not for single, individual objects. In general, the laws of quantum mechanics (QMy) are permutationally invariant, i.e. they are invariant with respect to an exchange of particles of the same kind. This means that numerically diTerent individual particles of the same kind are treated identically by the laws. The laws do not distinguish between two electrons, two protons …, etc.; they remain the same laws when we exchange two electrons, two protons, two neutrons or also two photons.
20 From this it follows that one of the conditions for (_yxz )fxz -z the condition that at most one x satisWes fx-is violated since more than one object (a whole class of objects of the same kind) satisWes the law. Thus, uniqueness of the QMobject is not satisWed.
6.3wUniqueness
A QM-object can also not be uniquely described as an individual object by accidental properties. Recall from §5.3 above that an object of classical mechanics can be so described, namely by the three magnitudes of position (pz ), momentum (qz ) and time (tz ). The reason that this is not possible for the QM-object is because the totality of accidental properties, which were needed for individualization or uniqueness, is not available at the same time. That is, the description by accidental properties is never complete, and thus we cannot get uniqueness for the respective objects if they are understood to be permanent in some reasonable way (cf. §6.4 below).
6.4wReidentiWcation
The QM-object is not identiWable through time; there is no temporal 21 For more details see Mittelstaedt 1986, pp. 227T. 22 The idea of using the history of human actions and decisions as a principle of individuation of human souls (after separation from the human bodyz -zwhich could not serve anymore as individuating) was proposed by Thomas Aquinas (De Veritate, 19, 1) as one, though not the only, possibility, since it is not suUcient in all cases (e.g. children who die immediately after birth). identity. In fact there are the following two possibilities:
(a) There is a position-measurement at tz 1 ; that is, we can have uniqueness of the object (or state of the system)-impenetrability being presupposed-only at the time tz 1 ; in this case the object or state dissolves later at tz 2 , so that we do not have uniqueness anymore, i.e. no permanent object.
(b) The two states cy(tz 1 ) and cy(tz 2 ) are connected by a law of QM through time (tz 1 , tz 2 ). But in this case only cy(tz 1 ) is unique with regard to one object or state (or system), since cy(tz 2 ) can then be satisWed by more than one object and therefore does not guarantee a designation ofz the original unique object. Although there is permanence given by the connection of the law, there is no guarantee that what is connected is the original object at a later time.
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6.5wTransworld identity For quantum mechanical objects or systems, uniquenessz -z the condition for using (_yxz )fxz -z is not satisWed. The reason is this: the characterization by their essential and permanent properties fails because with them only classes of objects or systems (like electrons, protons, photons) can be determined. But also a characterization by accidental properties like position and momentum at a certain time is impossible, since only a part of such properties is simultaneously available. Still another possibility for a unique characterization would be a description of a suf-{ Wciently complete historical development of the object (instead of giving only the actual properties at a certain point of time). 22 However, it is an unsolved problem how such a description could be obtained and used for the individuation of quantum mechanical objects. Since transworld identity of objects implies reidentiWability of one unique object in diTerent worlds, it follows that transworld identity of quantum mechanical objects is not possible. There may be, however, a kind of weak analogy of transworld identity if the following restrictions and deviations with respect to a Kripke-style semantics are made:
satisWed by special values of the accidental properties of position (pz ), momentum (qz ) and point of time (ty). But in §6.3 it was shown that uniqueness is not satisWed on the microlevel in QMz . Concerning SR, uniqueness with regard to p, q, tz holds only partially; namely it holds only for objects appearing in the past and future light cone of the observer (dynamical laws being presupposed). With respect to GR, uniqueness is dependent on the space-time curvature.
7.4wReidentiWability
With respect to both SR and GR, the object of reference is not in general reidentiWable through time; this is so because essential properties of the object like geometrical shape and mass may change depending on movement. Therefore reidentiWability holds only approximately in local reference frames of space-time.
7.5wTime and simultaneity
With respect to both SR and GR, there is neither a universal time, nor universal simultaneity. Each diTerent observer (i.e. each diTerent laboratory or reference system) has its own time and simultaneity. Therefore the object of reference is not the same for all observers.
summary
As a consequence of what has been elaborated in sections 5 to 7 we may say that Russell's idea of characterizing an individual object with the help of a deWnite description expressing uniqueness is applicable to individual objects of everyday life and to physical objects of classical mechanics. But it is only approximately applicable with restrictions to objects in the domain of quantum mechanics and in the domain of the special and general theories of relativity.
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